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The most notable feature of the notion of states of emergency is the assumption 
of their unpredictability. As such, it has been both normatively and positively 
deeply embedded in constitutional thought and practice to this day. However, 
notwithstanding its unavoidable advantages, I try to claim that it represents a so-
mewhat outdated concept that stands in opposition to the normative development 
of constitutions in general, and more specifically to the development of the notion 
of fundamental rights and freedoms. Taking the American history of the evolution 
of fundamental (constitutional) rights and freedoms as the starting point, I focus 
on two comparative examples (France and Croatia) which offer some emergency 
experiences, but which both belong to the period well before these two countries 
actually started to construe their own constitutional vision of fundamental rights 
and freedoms (from 1971 and 1999, respectively). My central argument is that 
the French Constitutional Council and the Croatian Constitutional Court have 
since then developed a significant body of case-law which must be taken into 
account when evaluating contemporary constitutional limitations of emergency 
measures.
Keywords: States of Emergency, crisis, emergency, constitutional review, Fun-
damental Rights and Freedoms
I. THE UNPREDICTABILITY OF CRISES AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The long history of political and constitutional thought related to states 
of emergency seems to constantly confirm one rather crucial conclusion: that 
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crisis	in	itself	cannot	always	be	properly	anticipated.	As	a	result,	legal	regulati-
on,	seeing	as	it	pertains	to	both	the	causes	and	consequences	of	emergencies,	











a	flexible	document	subject	primarily	to	political	interpretations.6 It must be 
admitted,	however,	that	constitutional	theory	in	that	respect	is	not	completely	
isolated	in	its	reasoning,	since	it	is	true	that	various	comparative	constitutional	
arrangements	 also	 follow	 the	 same	 line	when	defining	 emergencies	 in	quite	
1	 See:	Locke,	J.,	The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes, 12th	ed.,	London,	Rivington,	
1824,	Vol.	4.,	Chapter	XIV:	Of	Prerogative,	par.	159,	160.	Available	at:	http://oll.
libertyfund.org/title/763,	March	26th 2014.
2	 See:	Rousseau,	J.	 J.,	The Social Contract,	New	York,	Hafner	Publishing	Company,	
1951,	Book	IV,	Chapter	VI:	Of	the	Dictatorship,	p.	110.
3	 See:	Federalist	No.	23	(A.	Hamilton),	The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the 
One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union,	December	18,	1787.
4	 See:	Schmitt,	C.,	Political Theology, Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty,	Chica-
go,	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2005,	pp.	6	–	7.	On	the	other	hand,	 for	exam-
ple,	see:	Machiavelli,	N.,	The Historical, Political, and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolo 
Machiavelli,	 tr.	 from	 Italian	 by	Christian	E.	Detmold,	Boston,	 J.	R.	Osgood	 and	
company,	1882,	pp.	170	–	171.
5	 See:	Rossiter,	C.	L.,	Constitutional Dictatorship – Crisis Government in the Modern De-
mocracies,	Princeton,	Princeton	University	Press,	1948,	p.	302.	
6	 See	generally:	Ackerman,	B.,	Before the Next Attack – Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age 
of Terrorism,	New	Haven	&	London,	Yale	University	Press,	2006;	Ackerman,	B.,	The 
Emergency Constitution,	Yale	Law	Journal,	no.	5,	Vol.	113,	2004,	pp.	1029	–	1091;	
Posner,	E.	A.	and	Vermeule,	A.,	Terror in the Balance – Security, Liberty and the Courts,	
New	York,	Oxford	University	Press,	2007;	Posner,	R.	A.,	Not a Suicide Pact – the 
Constitution in a Time of National Emergency,	New	York,	Oxford	University	Press,	
2006;	Yoo,	J.,	The Powers of War and Peace – the Constitution and Foreign Affairs after 
9/11,	Chicago	and	London,	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2006;	Gross,	O.	and	
Ní	Aoláin,	F.,	Law in Times of Crisis – Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice,	New	
York,	Cambridge	University	Press,	2006.




the need of protection of the state and social order facing a serious and immi-
nent	threat,	end	up	in	categories	which	cannot	be	precisely	defined.	As	such,	it	
seems that broad definitions of emergencies necessarily operate as standards.7 
On	the	other	hand,	it	seems	that	relying	upon	“standards”	does	not	com-
pletely	take	into	account	the	fact	that	modern	constitutional	documents	are	






is	 essentially	 a	normative,	but	also	a	 comparative	 claim,	 some	clarifications	
thereof should be presented here. 
On	a	normative	level,	the	essential	idea	may	be	summarized	through	the	







7	 See:	Gross,	O.	and	Ní	Aoláin,	F.,	Law in Times of Crisis – Emergency Powers in Theory 
and Practice,	op. cit.,	p.	45.
8	 For	the	issue	of	a	higher	level	of	legal	validity	of	constitutional	rights,	as	they	are	
related	to	other	“ordinary”,	legally	conferred	rights,	see:	Rivers,	J.,	A Theory of Con-




recognized	 as	 “fundamental”	 and	 that	 “…what	we	have	 is	 settled	 constitutional	
doctrine	 that	 there	 is,	 indeed…a	hierarchy	of	 rights,	 and	 that	 some	 rights	must	
receive	more	vigilance	and	protection	 than	others.”	See:	Konvitz,	M.	R.,	Funda-
mental Rights – History of Constitutional Doctrine,	New	Brunswick	(U.S.A.)	and	Lon-
don	(U.K),	Transaction	Publishers/Rutgers	University,	2001,	pp.	13	and	17.	The	
concept of a hierarchically supreme position of fundamental rights is also accepted 
with	certain	French	authors.	See:	Favoreu,	L.	et al.,	Droit des libertés fondamentales,	4e 
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present only certain political and social concepts and appear as real subjective 
édition,	Paris,	Éditions	Dalloz,	2007,	p.	92.	The	same	in:	Feldman,	D.,	Civil Liber-
ties and Human Rights in England and Wales,	2nd	ed.,	Oxford,	Oxford	University	Press,	
2002,	p.	5.	
9	 Particular	elements	of	the	definition	are	in	such	a	way	intertwined	that	it	can	be	




erty, and Justice – The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism,	Oxford,	Clarendon	
Press,	1994,	pp.	143	–	144.	On	a	comparable	use	of	these	elements,	see	also:	Favo-
reu,	L.	et al.,	Droit des libertés fondamentales,	op. cit.,	p.	85;	Starck,	C.,	Constitutional 
Definition and Protection of Rights and Freedoms,	in:	Starck,	C.	(ed.),	Rights, Institutions 





M.	de	Condorcet,	Th.	Paine	etc.).	On	this,	see:	Favoreu,	L.	et al.,	Droit des libertés 
fondamentales,	op. cit.,	pp.	19	–	23;	Colliard,	C-A.	and	Letteron,	R.,	Libertés publiques,	
8e	édition,	Paris,	Éditions	Dalloz,	2005,	pp.	19	–	46.
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rights	addressed	towards	state	bodies,	but	for	a	long	time	during	the	classical	
liberalism	period	only	through	legislative	regulation.	It	is	only	with	the	third	
phase,	and	mostly	 in	the	second	part	of	 the	20th	century,	 that	rights,	along	
with	the	recognition	of	the	legally	binding	force	of	a	constitution,	acquired	a	
true and effective constitutional meaning.
From	that	point	of	view,	the	experiences	of	the	United	States	surely	deser-
ve primacy because the process of development of rights as briefly described 
here	first	started	in	that	country.	The	American	example	is	somewhat	specific	
because	the	original	version	of	the	US	Constitution	contained	only	a	few	gu-








the enactment of the 14th	Amendment	to	the	US	Constitution.	The	essenti-
al	 relationship	between	the	14th	Amendment	and	fundamental	 rights	 in	the	
American	constitutional	system	arose	from	the	Due	Process	Clause,	according	















practical steps in the evolution of fundamental rights concepts could be observed 
already	with	J.	Madison	and	in	the	opinion	of	the	judge	B.	Washington,	formulated	
in	the	case	of	Corfield	v.	Coryell	in	1823.	On	this,	see:	Konvitz,	M.	R.,	Fundamental 
Rights – History of Constitutional Doctrine,	op. cit.,	pp.	8	–	10.
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sented the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty…principles of justice so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental”.14




review	 and	 the	 “strict	 scrutiny”	 review.	The	 latter	 category,	 as	 a	 form	of	 a	
stronger	judicial	review	test,	at	the	same	time	represents	the	basic	parameter	
in	qualifying	the	fundamental	rights,	even	though	its	application	is	not	merely	















ge to the fundamental rights as distinguished from claims that are not fundamental 
rights.”	See:	Konvitz,	M.	R.,	Fundamental Rights – History of Constitutional Doctrine,	
op. cit.,	 p.	 17.	 For	 the	 same	 conclusion,	 see	 also:	Killian,	 J.	H.,	Costello,	G.	 A.,	
Thomas,	K.	R.	(eds.),	The Constitution of the United States of America – Analysis and 














history rights and liberties actually did achieve	the	quality	of	constitutionally	




It seems clear that these conclusions stand in a normative opposition to 
principal historically embedded	 assumptions	 about	 emergencies,	 namely	 their	
previously mentioned presumption of unpredictability and an additional (and re-
sulting)	idea	that	everything	should	be	somehow	left	to	the	discretionary power 
of regulation by the executive.	Let	me	say	something	about	all	of	these	three	di-
mensions of the problem.
As	for	the	presumption of unpredictability,	even	if	one	accepts	that	causes of 
emergencies	may	not	always	be	properly	anticipated	or	regulated	in	advance,	
there is no valid reason to assume that the same can be said generally of their 








stitutionality	of	a	law,	while	the	law	itself	is	presumed	constitutional. The general 
overview	of	the	rationality	and	strict	scrutiny	tests	in	this	place	is	derived	from	the	
following	 sources:	Nowak,	 J.	E.,	Rotunda,	R.	D.	 and	Young,	 J.	N.,	Constitutional 
Law,	op. cit.;	Stone,	G.R.,	Seidman,	L.M.,	Sunstein,	C.R.	and	Tushnet,	M.V.,	Con-
stitutional Law,	op. cit.;	Sullivan,	K.	M.	and	Gunther,	G.,	Constitutional Law,	op. cit. 
















status and their special (judicial) protection.18 

























2004,	pp.	1131	–	1132;	Stone,	G.	R.,	Perilous Rimes – Free Speech in Wartime (From 
the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Terrorism),	New	York,	W.	W.	Norton	&	Comp.	
Inc.,	2004,	pp.	12	–	14;	Cole,	D.,	No Reason to Believe: Radical Skepticism, Emergency 
Power, and Constitutional Constraint,	University	 of	Chicago	 Law	Review,	Vol.	 75,	






Co.	 v.	 Sawyer,	 343	U.S.	 579	 (1952),	 Ex	 parte	Milligan,	 71	U.S.	 2	 (1866)	 and	
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executive21 or disadvantages of courts22.	Among	such	arguments	are	that,	when	
it	comes	to	emergencies,	constitutional	interpretations	must	be	“flexible”	and	
take	 into	 account	 the	 “Hamiltonian”	 logic	of	 inherent	 executive	powers,	 as	
well	as	unspecified	judicial	powers23,	that	legislative	branch	in	emergencies	has	







is	given	in:	Epstein,	L.,	Ho,	D.	E.,	King,	G.	and	Segal,	J.	A.,	The Supreme Court during 
Crisis: How War Affects only Non-War Cases,	New	York	University	Law	Review,	Vol.	
80,	2005,	pp.	1	–	116.
21	 See	the	arguments	furthered	by	A.	Hamilton	in:	Federalist	No.	70	(A.	Hamilton),	
The Executive Department Further Considered,	March	18,	1788;	Federalist	No.	74	(A.	




R.	A.,	Not a Suicide Pact – the Constitution in a Time of National Emergency,	op. cit.,	pp.	
9	and	35;	Posner,	E.	A.	and	Vermeule,	A.,	Terror in the Balance – Security, Liberty 
and the Courts,	 op. cit.,	p.	49.	However,	one	 should	also	note	 the	opposing	 “civil	
libertarian”	arguments	stressed	by	G.	Stone	and	D.	Cole	that,	for	example:	courts	












National Security v. Civil Liberties,	California	Law	Review,	Vol.	95,	2007,	p.	2209;	
Cole,	D.,	Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of 
Crisis,	Michigan	Law	Review,	Vol.	101,	2002-2003,	pp.	2575	–	2577.




24	 On	this,	for	example,	see:	Posner,	E.	A.	and	Vermeule,	A.,	Terror in the Balance – Se-
curity, Liberty and the Courts,	op. cit.,	p.	47.
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that	in	the	contemporary	American	experiences	related	to	the	“War	on	Terror”	
it	was	affirmed	that	courts really do have a significant role and that rights as such 



































this,	see:	Stone,	G.	R.,	National Security v. Civil Liberties,	op. cit.,	pp.	2203	–	2212;	
Cole,	D.,	Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of 
Crisis,	op. cit.,	pp.	2565	–	2595.	
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a broad definition of terrorism and in an attempt to predict the possibility of 
similar	developments	in	a	comparative	perspective,	I	am	using	the	examples	
of	detention	and	prohibition	of	torture	and	focusing	on	two	countries	(France	






of	 states	of	emergency	 in	 the	countries	 I	am	examining	here,	constitutional	
protection	of	“fundamental”	rights	and	freedoms	has	constantly	been	evolving	
in	 the	 way	 as	 to	 (contrary	 to	 previous	 historical	 periods	 when	 it	 generally	
amounted to proclamation of merely politically binding standards) give those 
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produced certain	 rulings	which	 in	 this	 respect	 should	be	 taken	 into	account.	
More	precisely,	I	am	focusing	on	those	courts	that	perform	the	task	of	constitu-
tional review of laws	through	which	they	bind	the	legislator	and	at	the	same	time	
create	modern	concepts	of	rights.	Consequently,	my	research	focuses	on	the	
understanding of rights as they develop within a particular constitutional order 
and as they depend upon the interpretations of national courts.	Therefore,	my	
approach	in	the	following	pages	will	try:	first,	to	show	that	France	and	Croatia	
have	had	experiences	with	emergencies	 in	 the	past;	 second,	 that	after	 these	
experiences	the	concepts	of	rights	and	liberties	significantly	evolved	through	
judicial	 interpretations;	 and	 third,	 that	 these	modern	 conceptions	 of	 rights	














that in contemporary constitutional systems there is solid ground to argue in 
favor	of	the	role	of	(constitutional)	courts,	both	in	the	general	developments	




it	 pertains	 to	 a	 sphere	 of	 the	 “ordinary”	majority	 rule,	 does	 not	 reveal	 the	
true constitutional meaning of rights. This particular constitutional meaning 
of	rights,	as	shown	in	previous	descriptions,	conceptually	arises	primarily	from	
interpretations	of	constitutional	courts	which	rule	on	what	is	beyond	the	re-














III. EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE – THE EXAMPLE OF FRANCE









tution	because	 it	 combines	 all	 the	 important	 elements	of	 analysis	 in	 the	French	
case:	it	is	by	far	the	most	powerful	emergency	provision;	it	is	a	typical	“executive”	
power;	 it	 is	 a	direct	 constitutional	 emergency	prerogative;	 it	has	only	been	used	
once	(in	1961)	and	well	before	the	development	of	“fundamental”	rights	and	free-
doms	actually	began	(in	1971).	























the	 conditions	 for	 the	 application	 of	Article	 16	have	 really	 been	 fulfilled.36 







On	the	other	hand,	the	role	of	the	French	State	Council	(Conseil d’État) in 
relation	to	Article	16	was	principally	clarified	in	one	important	decision	from	






lip,	L.,	Les grandes décisions du Conseil constitutionnel,	13e	édition,	Paris,	Dalloz,	2005,	











French	State	Council,	see	also:	Long,	M.	et al.,	Les grands arrêts de la jurisprudence 
administrative,	15e	édition,	Paris,	Éditions	Dalloz,	2005,	pp.	546	–	555.
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in the present case due to the fact that the applicants contested the presiden-
























problem	of	the	“rights	of	defense”.	After	the	decision	in	the	case	of	Rubin de Servens 
and others	was	delivered,	the	Council	also	issued	several	other	decisions	in	the	same	
manner,	denying	that	it	had	the	competence	to	review	presidential	decisions,	for	
instance,	touching	upon	individual	liberty.	See:	Long,	M.	et al.,	Les grands arrêts de 
la jurisprudence administrative,	op. cit.,	pp.	551	–	552.
43	 CE	Ass.	19	octobre	1962,	Canal,	Robin	et	Godot,	Rec.	552.	See:	Long,	M.	et al.,	Les 












velopment of constitutionally (and judicially) protected rights and freedoms. 



















Council	has	no	competence	 to	 review	 the	 constitutionality	of	presidential	 emer-
gency decisions in the strict sense. There remains a possibility that this could be 
done	 through	 the	 institution	 of	 the	 “priority	 preliminary	 ruling	 on	 the	 issue	 of	







QPC	to	Article	16	decisions.	On	this,	see:	Favoreu,	L.	et al.,	Droit constitutionnel,	op. 
cit.,	p.	343;	Verpeaux,	M.,	La question prioritaire de constitutionnalité,	Paris,	Hachette	
Livre,	2013,	pp.	47	–	49.	However,	it	should	be	stressed	that	some	French	authors	
explicitly	argue	that	the	QPC	procedure	could	be	used	for	a	review	of	Article	16	me-
asures.	See:	Gaïa,	P.	et al.,	Les grandes décisions du Conseil constitutionnel,	17e	édition,	
Paris,	Dalloz,	2013,	p.	591.
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since	1971	should	well	be	taken	into	account	when	anticipating	possible	fu-
ture	Article	16	measures.	In	more	concrete	terms,	if	judicial	review,	which	in	






As	 to	 the	problem	of	 detention,	 the	principal	 paradigm	 I	have	 taken	 to	
explain	in	reference	to	the	French	context,	it	may	be	noticed	that	a	number	
of significant constitutional interpretations have been developed in the last 
decades,	 and,	most	notably,	 it	 took	place	 after	 the	1961	 crisis	 experiences.	
In	French	constitutional	philosophy,	protection	 from	arbitrary	detention	or	
arrest	 is	principally	 linked	 to	 the	notions	of	“security”	and	“liberty”,	which	






ins	of	 substantive	and	procedural	criminal	 law.	Moreover,	 in	direct	 relation	









1977	 (Fouille	 des	 véhicules).	On	 this,	 see	 also:	Colliard,	C-A.	 and	Letteron,	R.,	
Libertés publiques,	op. cit.,	p.	166;	Favoreu,	L.	et al.,	Droit des libertés fondamentales,	op. 
cit.,	p.	176.
48	 See:	Colliard,	C-A.	and	Letteron,	R.,	Libertés publiques,	op. cit.,	pp.	183	–	185;	Favo-
reu,	L.	et al.,	Droit des libertés fondamentales,	op. cit.,	pp.	322	–	323.




























les)).	See:	Favoreu,	L.	et al.,	Droit des libertés fondamentales,	op. cit.,	p.	176.








360	DC	 du	 2	 février	 1995,	 (Injonction	 pénale);	 Cons.	 const.,	 2	mars	 2004,	 n°	
2004-492	DC,	Perben	II;	Cons.	const.	9	janvier	1980,	n°	79-109	DC,	Prévention	de	















principle of proportionality must be applied.56
Although	it	is	true	that	the	above	standards	are	derived	from	a	wide	variety	
of	cases	which	themselves	are	not	exclusively	 linked	to	the	field	of	criminal	
law,	 they	nevertheless	might	 generally	be	used	as	 the	French	 “counterpart”	
of	“Due	Process”	and	thus	they	might	be	approached/understood	as	“essential 
constitutional promises (that) may not be eroded”	if	one	intends	to	frame	a	“basic 
system of independent review”.57	I	would	propose	that	the	standards	as	such	might	




tion,	which	is	explained	furthermore	in	the	main	text,	see: Favoreu,	L.	et al.,	Droit 



















































61	 On	this,	see: Favoreu,	L.	et al.,	Droit des libertés fondamentales,	op. cit.,	pp.	314	–	317.
62	 See:	Colliard,	C-A.	and	Letteron,	R.,	Libertés publiques,	op. cit.,	p.	178.
63	 On	this,	see:	Colliard,	C-A.	and	Letteron,	R.,	Libertés publiques,	op. cit.,	pp.	177	–	
178.
64	 See	 the	 decision	 of	 the	Croatian	Constitutional	Court:	U-I-179/1991,	 June	24th 
1992.




ted,	 that	 he	had	 an	 independent	 constitutional	 power	 to	declare	 a	 state	 of	
emergency	and	that	his	decrees	were	not	restrained	by	constitutional	provisi-
ons regulating retroactivity.
The most interesting point of the case arises out of its comprehensive the-
oretical	potential:	not	only	that	the	presidential	decrees	through	which	these	



































concepts belonging to all (the citizen and the man) and at the strengthening 
of	their	protection	through	more	precise	definitions	and	procedures.	On	the	


















tional	 interpretation	 that	aims	 to	 introduce	 the	 theory	of	“unconstitutional	
constitutional	amendments”.









cionalizam i sudski aktivizam – ustavna demokracija između zahtjeva za vladavinom većine 
i protuvećinskog argumenta,	doktorska	disertacija,	Split,	Pravni	fakultet	Sveučilišta	u	
Splitu,	2009,	pp.	359	–	360. 





Additionally,	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 other	 constitutional	 provisions	 that	
are	 inherently	 relevant	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 “torture”	 and	 “ill-treatment”	 but	
in	this	area,	again	since	very	recently,	the	Court	has	so	far	been	delivering	its	
decisions mainly in reference to the constitutionality of particular individual 
measures,	and	not	legislation	in	general.72	However,	since	these	interpretations	
were	delivered	in	a	constitutional	complaint	procedure,	they	cannot	be	seen	
as	 directly	 binding	 on	 the	 legislature	 and,	 consequently,	 cannot	 be	directly	







regulating the inadmissibility of illegal evidence. The category of illegal eviden-
ce,	apart	from	that,	for	instance,	obtained	by	an	infringement	of	constitutio-
nal,	legal	and	international	law	provisions	guaranteeing	prohibition	of	torture	














For	a	commentary	of	this	decision,	see:	Krapac,	D.,	Kazneno procesno pravo, Prva knji-
ga: Institucije,	V.	izmijenjeno	i	dopunjeno	izdanje,	Zagreb,	Narodne	novine,	2012,	
pp.	38	–	40.






then reasoned that even though some of the rights contained in the contested 









Comparing	 different	 countries	 carries	 the	 risk	 of	 oversimplification	 and	
surely	 not	 every	 aspect	 of	 a	 certain	 experience	 can	 directly	 be	 applied	 to	











were	 to	 face	 a	 grave	 emergency	 comparable	 to	 the	American	 example,	 it	 is	
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Sažetak
Āorđe Gardašević *
AMERIČKA ISKUSTVA – PROMIŠLJANJE EUROPSKE 
BUDUĆNOSTI
Ključna karakteristika pojma izvanrednih stanja jest postavka o njihovoj nepred-
vidivosti. Kao takva ona je do današnjeg dana duboko ukorijenjena u ustavnopravnoj 
misli i praksi. Ipak, bez obzira na eventualne prednosti koje takvo viđenje može pružati, 
ono u jednoj mjeri predstavlja prevladani koncept koji stoji u opreci prema normativnom 
razvoju ustava općenito, a posebno prema razvoju pojma temeljnih ljudskih prava i 
sloboda. Polazeći od američke povijesti razvoja temeljnih (ustavnih) prava i sloboda, 
u ovom tekstu obrađuju se dva primjera (Francuska i Hrvatska) koji nude određena 
praktična iskustva u području izvanrednih stanja, ali koja su u obama slučajevima ve-
zana uz povijesno razdoblje koje u znatnoj mjeri prethodi početku izgradnje suvremenih 
koncepcija temeljnih prava i sloboda (u Francuskoj od 1971., a u Hrvatskoj od 1999. 
godine). Središnji argument je da su francusko Ustavno vijeće i hrvatski Ustavni sud 
u međuvremenu razvili značajan korpus sudske prakse koja se mora uzimati u obzir 
prilikom procjene odgovarajućih ustavnih ograničenja izvanrednih mjera koje bi se u tim 
državama mogle pojaviti u budućnosti.
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